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and shifting to tests designed to assure both adverseness and a check
on the administrative process, the courts would be offered the
opportunity to better safeguard both the public interest and that of
private litigants.
IX. JUDICIAL REVIEW-ACTIONS REVIEWABLE
SEC Non-A ction Decision Constitutes "Reviewable Order"
In Medical Committee For Human Rights v. SEC' the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that
a Securities and Exchange Commission decision not to object to Dow
Chemical Company's 2 exclusion of a stockholder's proposal from
proxy materials was a judicially reviewable order. The Medical
Committee for Human Rights, a Dow stockholder, had requested
that a resolution to amend the Dow charter to bar the sale of napalm,
unless assurances were given that it would not be employed to injure
humans, be included in the proxy materials sent to stockholders for
the 1968 annual meeting. Dow rejected the Medical Committee's
request, relying on SEC proxy rules 14a-8(c)(2) and 14a-8(c)(5). 3 The
Medical Committee then revised its proposal to resolve that Dow
stockholders request that the board of directors consider the
1. 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 39 U.S.L.W. 3409 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1971)
(No. 1162).
2. In late 1967 the Dow Chemical Company was a target of antiwar demonstrations,
directed primarily at Dow recruiters visiting college campuses, as students objected to the
company's manufacture of napalm for use in the Vietnam conflict. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Dec. 18, 1967, at 8. Dow faced a different type of protest against its manufacture of napalm
when a stockholder proposed an amendment to the company's certificate of incorporation which
would have precluded the sale of napalm in the absence of assurance of nonuse against humans.
Letter from Quentin D. Young, National Chairman, Medical Committee for Human Rights, to
Secretary, Dow Chemical Company, Mar. 11, 1968, found in Certificate of Transcript of
Record at la-3a, Medical Committee v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970) [hereinafter cited
as Record]. The stockholder's objections to the sale of napalm were based primarily on
"concerns for human life," but concern was also expressed for the company's business future
because of its difficulty in recruiting capable college graduates. Id.
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c) (1970). The Commission's proxy rules provide a procedure for
submission of individual stockholder proposals to corporate management for inclusion in the
corporation's proxy statement. Id. § 240.14a-8. Under these rules an otherwise properly
submitted stockholder proposal may be excluded by management when it is submitted
"primarily for the purpose of promoting general economic, political, racial, religious, social or
similar causes," id. at 8(c)(2), or when it asks management to "take action with respect to a
matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary business operations of the [company]." Id. at
8(c)(5). When a company decides to exclude a proposal it must file with the SEC a copy of the
proposal, any stockholder statement in support thereof, and management's reasons for
exclusion, supported by opinions of counsel when the exclusion is based on matters of law. Id. at
8(d).
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advisability of adopting an amendment "that the company shall not
make napalm"; 4 SEC staff review, and oral argument if necessary,
was requested if Dow persisted in its position.5 The SEC Division of
.Corporation Finance subsequently accepted Dow's interpretation of
the proxy rules and recommended no Commission action if Dow
excluded the proposal.6 The Medical Committee renewed its request
for Commission review and oral argument.7 Ultimately the SEC
"approved the recommendation of the Division of Corporation
Finance that.no objection be raised if the Company omit the
proposals from its proxy statements for the forthcoming meeting of
shareholders."' The Medical Committee then petitioned the Court of
Appeals for the District of.Columbia Circuit for review of the SEC
response.
Although the federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction for
violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 and rules and
regulations adopted thereunder, t" any person "aggrieved by an order
issued by the Commission in a proceeding under [the Act] to which
such person is a party may obtain a review of such order" in the
United States courts of appeals." The SEC answered the Medical
Committee's petition by contending that the court of appeals lacked
jurisdiction to hear the case,' 2 while the Medical Committee relied on
4. Letter froni Quentin D. Young, General Counsel, Dow Chemical Company, Feb. 3, 1969,
found in Record 16a.
5. The SEC had received copies of prior communications between the Medical Committee
and Dow. See Record la, 4a, 5a.
6. Letter from Courtney Whitney, Chief Counsel, Division of Corporation Finance, SEC, to
Secretary, Dow Chemical Co., Feb. 18, 1969,found in Record 20a.
7. The Medical Committee's counsel argued that the proposal could not be excluded under
SEC rule 14a-8(c)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a.8(c)(2) (1970), because the primary purpose of the
proposal was to aid business and that political purposes were subsidiary. Also, exclusion under
rule 14a-8(c)(5) was opposed on the grounds that an amendment to the Certificate of
Incorporation could not, under Delaware law, be part of the "ordinary business operations" of
the company. Letter from Jeffrey D. Bauman, Counsel, Medical Committee, to SEC, Feb. 28,
1969,found in Record 26a.
8. Letters from SEC to Jeffrey D. Bauman, Counsel, Medical Committee, and WA.
Groening, Jr., General Counsel, Dow Chemical Co., Apr. 2, 1969,found in Record 44a-45a.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa et seq. (1964).
10. Id. § 78aa; 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 etseq. (1970).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a) (1964) (emphasis added); cf M.G. Davis & Co. v. Cohen, 256 F.
Supp. 128, 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), af/d, 369 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1966). See also Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (Supp. V, 1970), the provisions of which have been held
applicable to the scope of judicial review of SEC action. In re Engineers Public Serv. Co., 221
F.2d 708, 712 (3d Cir. 1955).
12. Answer Brief for Respondent at 10. Because they maintained this position throughout
the proceedings, the Commission never argued the merits of the Medical Committee's proposal
in any of its briefs.
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section 25(a) of the Act to provide jurisdiction, claiming that it was an
"aggrieved party" as a result of an SEC "order" allowing Dow to
omit the Committee proposal from the proxy solicitation materials.
Avoiding express use of the term "order," the District of Columbia
Circuit nevertheless implicitly found a reviewable order under section
25(a) by applying concepts of finality, formality, and pragmatism
outside the express statutory language.
Pre-Medical Committee section 25(a) review cases focused on the
existence of an "order" resulting from a "proceeding" and on the
issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies. A preliminary decision
to hold an investigation was previously held unreviewable because it
was not a final order,13 and an SEC letter denying a request for
amendment of certain Commission filing requirements has been held
not an order because there was no "proceeding." 1 But in American
Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v. SEC 5 an SEC denial of confidential
treatment to information filed with the agency, after a hearing, was
held to be an order reviewable under section 25(a) because it affected
only the petitioner and not the public generally. 6 Based upon the
provision of the act that "[n]o objection to the order of the
Commission shall be considered by the court unless such objection
shall have been urged before the Commission,"1 7 exhaustion of
administrative remedies has been held a prerequisite to section 25(a)
review."8 Thus, before Medical Committee, the word "order" as used
in, section 25 has been held to imply some element of administrative
finality. 9 In short, section 25(a) had previously been interpreted to
13. SEC v. Andrews, 88 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1937). Review was denied on the grounds that the
petitioner had sought relief from a district court, which is without jurisdiction to review under
section 25(a), and that the order was merely interlocutory and, as uch, ueqeviewable under
section 25(a). Cf. Guaranty Underwriters, Inc. v. SEC, 131 F.2d 370 (th Ci. 1942).
14. Third Ave. Ry. v. SEC, 85 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1936).
15. 93 F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
16. 93 F.2d at 239. In finding the order to have affected the petitioner
particularly-individually--the court distinguished Third Ave. Ry. v. SEC, 85 F.2d 914 (2d Cir.
1936), which affected the petitioner generally--others were similarly affected by certain filing
requirements. As to the allegations of irreparable harm, see note 33 infra. The court also held
that the availability of relief in equity was not a bar to review under section 25(a) when such
review might he more convenient to the aggrieved party. See notes 72-84 infra and
accompanying text.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a) (1964).
18. See, e.g., Gearhart & Otis, Inc. v. SEC, 348 F.2d 798, 800-01 (D.C. Cir. 1965); R.A.
Holman & Co. v. SEC, 323 F.2d 284, 287-88 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 943 (1963); The
Wolf Corp. v. SEC, 317 F.2d 139, 142-43 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Schwebel v. Orrick, 251 F.2d 919
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 927 (1958).
19. Cf. Okin v. SEC, 143 F.2d 960, 961 (2d Cir. 1944); Jones v. SEC, 79 F.2d 617, 619 (2d
Cir. 1935), rev'don other grounds, 298 U.S. 1 (1936).
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preclude judicial review except for final orders resulting from
proceedings solely affecting individual petitioners.
Judicial interpretations of similar statutes 20 suggest other
components of section 25(a) which require consideration. In FPC v.
Metropolitan Edison Co. 21 the Supreme Court, in analyzing review
under the Federal Power Act,2 limited it to orders of a "definitive
character," not "merely procedural," resulting from an evidentiary,
fact-finding hearing.2 Such an exhaustion requirement was deemed to
be dictated by the statute's policy against "constant delays . . . for
the purpose of reviewing mere procedural requirements or
interlocutory directions." A further explanation of the definitive
versus procedural order distinction was provided in Mallory Coal Co.
v. National Bituminous Coal Commission s where judicial review of
an order for disclosure of certain confidential information under the
Bituminous Coal Act of 193726 was denied because the order was
deemed a preliminary step in a procedural program for determining
rates and marketing provisions for bituminous coal. Since the order
was not the type generally preceded by a hearing and supported by
findings, it- did not warrant review.2Y Subsequent to Metropolitan
20. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1336 (1964), pro.ides for review of petitions brought to
enjoin, set aside, or suspend "any order" of the ICC. An examination of Frozen Food Express
v. United States, 351 U.S. 40 (1956), CBS v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942), and United
States v. Los Angeles R.R., 273 U.S. 299 (1927), decided under this statute and its predecessors,
indicates the progression from judicial reliance on formal agency action as a prerequisite to
finding a reviewable order, to judicial analysis of the substantial effect of the action on a
petitioner. However, in both CBS and Frozen Food such an analysis was facilitated by the
presence of agency action of a more formal nature than in Medical Committee. See notes 50-51
infra and accompanying text. See generally L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION 398 (1965) [hereinafter cited as JAFFE].
21. 304 U.S. 375 (1938).
22. 16 U.S.C. § 8251(b) (1964). The Act provides that "[a]ny party to a proceeding under
[the Act] aggrieved by an order issued by the [Federal Power] Commission in such proceeding
may obtain a review of such order .. "
23. 304 U.S. at 383-84. The Court felt that review of procedural orders would unnecessarily
delay the administrative process. In Metropolitan Edison Co. the order at issue provided for a
hearing on a certain date in conjunction with an FPC investigation of the petitioner.
24. Id. Of course, interlocutory appeals in an ongoing proceeding might save time by
convincing an appellant of the futility of continuing to prosecute his action or by revealing fatal
flaws in agency policy or procedure without the necessity of completing the full administrative
process.
25: 99 F.2d 399 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
26. Act of April 26, 1937, ch. 127, 50 Stat. 72. The portion of that Act under consideration
was virtually identical to section 25(a).
27. 99 F.2d at 405-06. However, injunctive relief might be available. See Utah Fuel Co. v.
National Bituminous Coal Comm'n, 306 U.S. 56 (1939); Shields v. Utah Idaho Cent. R.R., 305
U.S. 177 (1938); Shannahan v. United States, 303 U.S. 596 (1938).
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Edison and Mallory the consequences of agency action rather than its
form or label were accepted as a test for the reviewability of some
agency orders. 2,1 Although the specific criteria of the legal
consequences test are difficult to isolate, it is apparent that finality is
no longer always required. 29 Under a statute authorizing judicial
review of final orders, 30 the District of Columbia Circuit in
Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States3 found reviewable an interlocutory,
pre-hearing order of the Federal Maritime Board permitting a rate
system agreement to become effective within forty-eight hours. A
denial of immediate review would have resulted in serious harm to
Isbrandtsen. Under cases such as Isbrandtsen finality has become a
function of the nature of individual legal injury caused by agency
action.
The additional statutory requirements of a "proceeding" 32 and an
"aggrieved party"' ' have usually been considered secondary to the
finding of an "order" since solution of the complex order issue either
moots these requirements if no order is found or otherwise facilitates
their rationalization. The Medical Committee approach to the section
25(a) reviewability question thus appears unique in light of prior
analyses of similar statutory language.
In analyzing the reviewability of an SEC decision to take no
28. Compare Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948); CBS v.
United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942); Cities Service Gas Co. v. FPC, 255 F.2d 860 (loth Cir.
1958); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 227 F.2d 470,474 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
1005 (1956); Phillips v. SEC, 171 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1948), with Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387
U.S. 136 (1967); lsbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 211 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
29. Thus, the test does not require a "final order [to be] the very last order." Isbrandtsen
Co. v. United States, 211 F.2d 51, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
30. 5 U.S.C. § 1032 (1964).
31. 211 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
32. See note I Isupra.
33. Although there is little authority wherein the absence of an aggrieved party has
precluded judicial review of agency action, the extent of the aggrievement appears to have aided
courts in finding an "order" warranting review. Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351
U.S. 40 (1956). See also lsbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 211 F.2d 51, 56 (D.C. Cir. 1954). In
this type of analysis several courts have used the words "irreparable harm" in describing the
damage which must be suffered by a party seeking review. CBS v. United States, 316 U.S. 407,
419 (1942); Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, supra; Phillips v. SEC, 171 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir.
1948); American Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v. SEC, 93 F.2d 236, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1937). But see
Mallory Coal Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Comm'n, 99 F.2d 399,407 (D.C. Cir. 1938). In
fact, the SEC argued that the absence of irreparable harm to Medical Committee should
preclude review. Respondent's Reply to Petitioner's Memorandum in Opposition to
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss at 12. However the court preferred the statutory term
"aggrieved" and there is no authority to depart from the statutory language and require the
apparently stricter standard of "irreparable harm." 432 F.2d at 667-68.
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action if a corporation refused to include a stockholder proposal in
proxy materials,3 4 the court resorted to "general principles and
analogies" because of ambiguous precedent and legislative history. 3
Reviewability was predicated on a balancing of three factors: finality,
formality, and pragmatic considerations. Such a test apparently
departs from previous tests discussed above. What remains to be seen
is whether such abandonment is actual, and, if so, its future impact.
A presumption of reviewability, allowing judicial review of
administrative action except where there is specific congressional
intent to the contrary,37 pervades the Medical Committee opinion.
The extent to which the presumption becomes a predisposition for
review is difficult to determine and may not be detrimental to efficient
agency action if the court's reviewability criteria are sound and
properly applied. Whether termed exhaustion of remedies or ripeness,
the principle of finality withholds judicial review except for those
controversies which are administratively complete.- Such a policy
theoretically assures a more complete, justiciable case for judicial
review and an efficient administrative process.39 Further, reviewing
34. The court first disposed of a challenge to the timeliness of the filing of the petition.
Section 25(a) requires that a petition for review be filed "within sixty days (60) after the entry"
of a Commissioi order. 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a) (1964). Sixty-six days elapsed between the entry of
the minute reflecting the Commission's deqision and the filing of the petition by the Medical
Committee. However, the Medical Committee did not receive written notification of the
Commission's decision until some time after the minute entry and a copy of thie minutes was
received even later. Relying on the need for a party to have "adequate notice of the substance of
the decision, and sufficient time to prepare his petition," the court refused to bar the petition for
untimeliness, 432 F.2d at 663-65.
35. -32 F.2d at 665. See note II supra and accompanying text.
36. What authority does exist offers only an assumption of nonreviewability of such
decisions but no real discussion of the issue. See, e.g., Klastorin v. Roth, 353 F.2d 182, 183 n.2
(2d Cir. 1965). See also Clusserath, The A mended Stockholder Proposal Rule: A Decade Later,
40 N.D. LAWYER 13, 17 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Clusserath]. The absence of any indication
of congressional intent to preclude review facilitates applying authority refusing to deny review.
Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367 (1962); Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958); Harmon v. Brucker,
355 U.S. 579 (1958); Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1956); Heikkila v. Barber, 345
U.S. 229 (1953); Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441 (1947).
37. See, e.g., Lane v. Hoglund, 244 U.S. 174 (1917); American School of Magnetic Healing
v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902); cf. Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666 (1960). See cases cited
in note 36 supra. Professor Davis discusses this presumption in terms of a common law of
reviewability rebuttable by Congress, 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 28.07
(1958), and in a similar manner Professor Jaffe calls it "a basic right [and] a traditional power"
subject to congressional elimination. JAFFE 346.
38. But see Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967), where pre-enforcem~nt review of
regulations issued by the Commissioner of Food and Drugs was authorized.
39. Some commentators would suggest that the case finally presented is then too complete
and leaves the court with an immense project of reviewing a lengthy record and a very technical
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only final actions facilitates early disposition of controversies through
the use of informal procedures rather than less effective "trial-type"
hearings.40 To a large extent finality is a "case or controversy"
problem similar to the constitutional inquiry required where parties
appeal to the federal judicial system for resolution of -differences;
therefore, usable finality criteria are essential. In examining the
finality of the SEC's action in Medical Committee, the court
acknowledged that the agency's administrative process had "run its
course" and noted that a possibility of a private collateral action 4'
against Dow did not negate any "aggrievement" suffered by the
Medical Committee from the SEC's decision.42 The court recognized
that time, the critical element in a proxy contest, militated against
such remedy. Further, in such an action the Medical Committee,
having lost in the more complete SEC proceedings, would face
judicial deference to Commission construction of its own proxy
rules.' 3 The SEC's argument that no irreparable harm had been
suffered by Medical Committee since such a private action was
available was thereby rejected.
The court deemed the alleged strong public interest in judicial
review of corporate democracy questions supportive of a finding of
aggrievement. But instead of noting authority acknowledging such a
public interest, 4 the court simply cited other public interests
previously held by the court to merit expeditious judicial review.4 The
addition of this substantial public interest test seemingly
acknowledged a discretionary element in reviewability somewhat akin
to review on certiorari before the Supreme Court. 4 The fact that the
SEC rendered a "no action" decision did not impede the court's
finding of aggrievement. While administrative refusal to act once
precluded judicial review 47 the so-called "negative-action" theory has
problem in a field unfamiliar to the court. Kaufman, Judicial Review of Agency Action: A
Judge's Unburdening. 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 201 (1970).
40. See 432 F.2d at 668-69.
41. See J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
42. 432 F.2d at 667.
43. Id. See, e.g., Dyer v. SEC, 266 F.2d 33 (8th Cir.), cert. denied. 361 U.S. 835 (1969);
Peck v. Greyhound Corp., 97 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
44. See S. 4003, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (Corporation Participation Bill introducted by
Senators Muskie and Eagleton).
45. See. e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Scanwell Labs., Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
46. Cf. Prettyman, Petitioning the United States Supreme Court-A Primer for Hopeful
Neophytes, 51 VA. L. REV. 582, 597-98 (1965).
47. See Proctor & Gamble Co. v. United States, 225 U.S. 282 (1912).
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been so repudiated48 that even administrative delay has come under
review. 9 By finding botb negative action and delay reviewable, courts
have done no more than acknowledge the practical effect of such
administrative conduct.5 0 The aggrievement requirement is not
reduced by concluding that non-action can determine rights or injure
a party as finally and effectively ag affirmative action. Even though
the SEC decision was only "no-action," practically it has as much
final effect on the Medical Committee as an affirmative decision
declaring the Dow exclusionary policy legitimate.
Analysis of the formality of the SEC decision in Medical
Committee presented difficult questions involving the type of
administrative action sufficient to warrant judicial review.
Administrative orders which follow formal, evidentiary, adversary-
type hearings preserved in transcripts present a more manageable,
clearly defined controversy for judicial review. But as already noted,
such a hearing is not necessarily a prerequisite to judicial review under
statutes similar to section 25(a).51 Therefore, although a formality
requirement may superficially appear to resurrect the definitive-
procedural order test of Metropolitan Edison and Mallory,12 it need
not go so far.0 Absent a minimum formality requirement, agencies
might be discouraged from rendering informal advice for fear of
judicial review.
Formality presents problems of degree, particularly concerning
agency proceedings short of a full hearing. Although a term such as
"judicial orders" may be used to indicate the type of action which is
reviewable, 54 it offers no help in determining the minimum formality
required for such an order. The formality factor is perhaps best
understood as related to the more precise determination of what is a
final order. The court seems to say that the more an agency decision
possesses formality characteristics, albeit short of a full hearing, the
more likely it is to be characterized as a judicially reviewable order. A
discussion of formality cannot be isolated from the court's discussion
of finality, but it is through formality that the court discusses the
48. See Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939).
49. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1098-100 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
50. See FPC v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 307 U.S. 156 (1939).
51. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
52. See notes 21-27 supra and accompanying text.
53. Cf Helco Prod. Co. v. McNutt, 137 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1943); American Sumatra
Tobacco Corp. v. SEC, 93 F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir. 1937); JAFFE 419.
54. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
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following aspects of the-final order determination: the availability of a
hearing when dealing with proxy statements; the formality
characteristics of the SEC decision; and the nature of proxy rule 14a-
8(d). The Act itself contains provisions for evidentiary hearings,5"
although not in the proxy section. 56 While the SEC did not argue that
only orders preceded by formal evidentiary hearings are reviewable
under section 25(a), it did maintain that only agency action for which
such a hearing has been authorized is reviewable.5 7 Since the SEC
proxy rules adopted pursuant to the Act's proxy section, particularly
rule 14a-8(d) dealing with management exclusion of stockholder
proposals, do not authorize a hearing, the SEC argued that agency
action predicated on them is not reviewable. The language of section
25(a) does not expressly condition judicial review on the holding of a
prior hearing or its availability,"' and reading such a requirement into
it appears strained. To require that a hearing be authorized, although
not necessarily used, to permit review has little rational basis and
appears to be only an attempt to salvage indirectly the Metropolitan
Edison requirement of an actual hearing. 59
Under SEC rules distinguishing between formal and informal
proceedings 0 the Commission argued that the proposal rejection was
55. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1964) (grant or denial of registration as a national securities
exchange); id. § 781(0 (termination or suspension of unlisted trading privileges on a national
securities exchange); id. § 78o(b)(5) (denial or revocation of registration as a broker-dealer);
id. § 78s(a)(l) (suspension or withdrawal of registration of a national securities exchange).
56. See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 450 (2d
ed. 1968). (The Commission attempts to utilize "informal methods to secure compliance with
the Proxy Rules.")
57. Respondent's Supplementary Memorandum In Response to the Reply Brief Filed by the
Petitioner at 7-8. The Commission relied on FPC v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 304 U.S. 375
(1938). See notes 31-39 supra and accompanying text. The SEC argued that "only those
definitive types of agency action are reviewable as to which an evidentiary hearing, if necessary,
would be appropriate under applicable law .. "
58. The section does contain language referring to findings of fact which might imply the
requirement of such a hearing:
Thefinding of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall
be conclusive. If either party shall apply to the court for leave to adduce additional
evidence, and shall show to the satisfaction of the court that such additional evidence is
material and that there were reasonable grounds for failure to adduce such evidence in the
hearing before the Commission, the court may order such additional evidence to be taken
before the Commission and to be adduced upon the hearing. . . . 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)
(1964) (emphasis added).
59. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
60. 17 C.F.R. § 202.1 (1970). The Commission has concluded that opinions obtained
through informal procedures "do not constitute an official expression of the Commission's
views," but in some instances may "be relied upon as representing the views of [an SEC]
division." Id. § 202.1(d).
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characterized by informality. Although the SEC decision is reflected
only by a minute in the Commission records'-a factor downgraded
by the Commission as the mere acceptance of a staff recommendation
not to act, 2 an advisory opinion,6 or the mere "courtesy of a response
to a complaining person" 64 -it is difficult to understand how the
Commission could seriously characterize its decision as informal after
the events transpiring between the Medical Committee, Dow, and the
Commission. Moreover, the Commission ignores the binding nature
of its "opinions" concerning stockholder proposals.65
Some authority exists for characterizing SEC action under proxy
rule 14a-8(d) informal and non-reviewable in a federal court of
appeals.6 6 Presumably the product of such action constitutes
unreviewable advice or information given merely to assist corporate
management.6 7 The authority cited by the court offers little
justification for terming proxy statement decisions informal; courts
have simply allowed the SEC to operate in this area free of judicial
restraint. While judicial reluctance to explore the esoteric field of
proxies and deference for Commission expertise is understandable,
such reluctance cannot be squared with the literal language of section
25(a) providing relief for parties aggrieved. Without any clear
authority the court extracted from rule 14a-8(d) an "adversariness"
test to determine the necessary formality for judicial review.6" The
61. Record, supra note 4, at 46a.
62. Respondent's Supplementary Memorandum In Response to the Reply Brief Filed by the
Petitioner at 3.
63. Respondent's Answering Brief at 34-35.
64. Id. at 19.
65. See 432 F.2d at 667.
66. The court in Klastorin v. Roth, 353 F.2d 182, 183 n.2 (2d Cir. 1965), said "review by the
Commission of the material is informal in nature." Klastorin had sought to enjoin use of a
proxy statement for alleged violation of section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
One commentator has described rule 14a-8 decisions as "informal administrative
determinations not directly subject to review by Courts of Appeals." Clusserath, supra note 36,
at 17.
67. See, e.g., Letter from Director, Division of Corporation Finance, to plaintiff's counsel,
Mar. 4, 1954, in Curtin v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., [1952-1956 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEc. L. REp. 90,659, at 91,999,92,002 (SEC 1954). The letter takes the position that an SEC
decision to take no action regarding management exclusion of a stockholder proposal does not
take place in a "proceeding" and gives the impression that presentation of both points of
view--stockholder and management-is at the good graces of the Commission and involves
only a nonreviewable opinion-giving process and not an order. Id. at 92,003.
68. Apparently "adversariness" is intended to be an element of the court's formality factor.
It is again difficult to confine such a discussion to formality when the degree of "adversariness"
may well contribute to finality. It is perhaps best to think in terms of final order and the
contribution "adversariness" makes thereto in spite of the court's organization.
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Commission argued that since rule 14a-8 (d) does not explicitly require
a stockholder to file a statement with the SEC in support of a request
for inclusion of a proposal, two opposing views are not presented and
no "adversariness" exists. But the rule certainly anticipates that the
controversy will have reached a stage where management and
stockholder have exchanged opposing viewpoints and have reached an
impasse, and implies the presentation of both viewpoints since it
requires management to file with the stockholder proposal "any
statement in support thereof as received from the security holder."69
When the procedure is fully utilized by both sides making a complete
presentation of their positions, as here, there is sufficient adversari-
ness to satisfy the reviewability test.
In addition to finding sufficient "adversariness" the court
determined rule 14a-8(d) mandatory and not permissive ° and the
burden of justifying exclusion of a proposal to be upon management. 71
Thus, the court rejected the SEC's attempts to label its administrative
actions and broadly defined formality in terms of the legal
consequences of the Commission's decision. 72
Having satisfied the factors of finality and formality, the court
met the SEC's strongest argument with a discussion of pragmatic
considerations. As noted previously, 73 in seeking review under section
25(a) the Medical Committee disregarded its opportunity to seek
enforcement of the proxy rules in a private action against Dow 74 under
section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act.75 Such an action could have
69. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(d) (1970). The SEC also argued that rule 14a-8(d) does not
require a review or a decision on the part of the Commission. Respondent's Answering Brief at
17. The extent to which absence of such a requirement can preclude review is doubtful when the
Commission does in fact render a decision which actually injures a party, and refusal to act may
be just as injurious as affirmative action. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428
F.2d 1093, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
70. 432 F.2d at 670. Management must file the stockholder proposal and both supporting
and opposing materials and forward the required information to the stockholders.
71. Id., citing 19 Fed. Reg. 246 (1954). But the Commission argued that this burden does
not apply to "an administrative proceeding before the Commission." Respondent's Reply to
Petitioner's Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss at 6. Instead the
burden would be on management in an injunction proceeding brought by the stockholder or the
Commission. Id. The court was apparently not concerned with this argument and certainly the
language of the Commission in placing the burden on management is not so restrictive. Id. at
246.
72. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
73. See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
74. J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). See generally Comment, Private Rights
and Federal Remedies: Herein of J.L Case v. Borak, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1150 (1965).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964).
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resulted in injunctive relief prior to the stockholder meeting or
subsequent relief designed to ameliorate the evil done by the
company's illegal action. 76 The SEC argued7" that by refusing to
pursue this alternative remedy the Medical Committee failed to
satisfy the requirement of being an "aggrieved" party.7s But the court
preferred to analyze the question in terms of the "more appropriate
forum."7 As demonstrated in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Hardin," a district court hearing the case could only remand to the
agency for further action, hardly a remedy more appropriate from the
standpoint of the timely inclusion of the Medical Committee's
proposal. Review under section 25(a) seemed uniquely appropriate
since the Committee was only asking for further agency action under
the proxy rules, not a complete trial."1 Furthermore, time and the
posture of the Medical Committee in a private action dictated section
25 (a) review.
Underlying the court's balancing of pragmatic factors was "an
independent public interest in having the controversy decided in its
present posture rather than in the context of a private action against
the company. 8 2 Viewing the proxy rules as designed principally to
protect investors, the court concluded that the SEC should not force
the stockholder to attempt through a private action what the SEC was
directed by Congress to do through regulation of proxy statements.,
Requiring private stockholder action would have the practical effect
of denying relief from arbitrary management decisions to the
individual investor seeking to use proxy procedures. Lengthy post-
stockholder meeting litigation, with accompanying expense, would
not encourage stockholder participation in corporate affairs. Direct
76. .1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,432-33 (1964).
77. Respondent's Answering Brief at 19 n.23.
78. See notes 42-43 supra and accompanying text.
79. 432 F.2d at 672.
80. 428 F.2d 1093, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
81. The Medical Committee's petition was framed more in terms of arbitrary agency action
than arbitrary private action by Dow, although allegations of both appear. The relief requested
was further agency action, not damages against Dow. In addition, there is authority which is
critical of the inconvenience and inefficiency of "bifurcation of judicial review" where the
existence of a final order is difficult to determine. Foti v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv.,
375 U.S. 217,232 (1963).
82. 432 F.2d at 672 (emphasis added).
83. Id. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n (Supp. V, 1970).
84. Cf. Hale v. FCC, 425 F.2d 557 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer,
424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ V.
FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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review under section 25(a) provides a quicker, less burdensome means
of protecting the investor's interests by requiring the Commission to
evaluate carefully the validity of management's planned exclusion of a
proposal.84 From a practical standpoint, direct reviewability was
essential to vindicate the statutory and regulatory scheme created to
promote fair dealing between management and investor.
Refusing to accept SEC predictions of the destruction of informal
advisory opinions if review were permitted, the court in Medical
Committee believed it was following congressional intent by
conducting limited review when necessary to protect stockholders
from.arbitrary corporate and Commission action. 81 Spurred by a
broad presumption of reviewability and pervasive fear of arbitrary
SEC non-action, the court assured individual stockholders that the
stockholder proposal rule is an operable, element of the Security
Exchange Act's concept of "protection of investors." It appears that
the court has made reviewable action which, arguably, had previously
been committed to agency discretion. In so doing it refused to follow a
traditional reviewability analysis oriented toward finding a final order
but instead applied certain general factors to determine the existence
85. See 432 F.2d at 675. Since the Commission had accepted Dow's reasoning, the
substantive basis for exclusion of the Medical Committee's proposal was found in rules 14a-
8(c)(2) and (5). See note 3 supra. In discussing the merits of the Medical Committee's petition
the court was critical of the SEC's blind acceptance of Dow's position, which placed the
stockholder in a dilemma and offered no assurance that Dow had sustained its burden of proof.
In addition, by excluding the proposal under both rules 14a-8(c)(2) and (5), the stockholder was
in effect told that his proposal was at the same time "too general" and "too specific." 432 F.2d
at 679. It was apparent to the court that these two rules could be used to exclude virtually all
proposals, and SEC use of both rules offered no administrative guidance to the Medical
Committee as to how it could appropriately exercise the rights of corporate democracy
purportedly available in the stockholder proposal rule. The exclusion of proposals which are
"primarily for the purpose of promoting general economic, political, racial, religious, social or
similar causes," 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(2) (1970), has been strongly criticized, see S. 4003,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); in any case there was sufficient doubt that this rule could
successfully exclude the Medical Committee's proposal concerning napalm. "IT]he proposal
relates solely to a matter that is completely within the accepted sphere of corporate activity and
control," 432 F.2d at 681, unlike other proposals which have been excluded under this rule. See
generally Emerson & Latcham, The SEC Proxy Proposal Rule: The Corporate Gadfly, 19 U.
CHi. L. REv. 807 (1952). The SEC was not presented with a matter calling for preservation of
management's freedom to act on ordinary business matters, but rather, possible use of the proxy
rules to preclude stockholder involvement in management's personal, moral, and political
choices. Expertise in such matters does not necessarily reside in management to any greater
extent than in the beneficial owners of the corporation, the stockholders. The court therefore
remanded the case to the SEC for discretionary consideration within a proper legal
framework-utilizing compatible rules of exclusion-and with directions to make its reasoning
sufficiently clear to permit effective review.
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of a reviewable order. Thus, the section 25(a) elements of
"aggrieved," "order," "proceeding," and "party" were generally
ignored, but by necessity all four of the elements had to be satisfied.
Portions of the statutory elements are to some extent found in each of
the three general factors-finality, formality, and pragmatisim-but
the difficulty in determining the amount of each general factor
requisite to finding one of the specific statutory elements is a prime
source of criticism of the new test. Although the test may
substantially liberalize reviewability, it offers no precise guidelines.
Moreover, although the court's sense of public interest is
commendable, its opinion warrants close scrutiny for the possibility
that an absolute right of appeal upon meeting certain standards has
been restructured into a discretionary right predicated upon the court
of appeals' appraisal of the public interest involved.
Yet there is reason to commend the result in Medical Committee.
It is altogether too likely that either individually or collectively
management and the SEC can arbitrarily act "within the proxy
rules" to stifle stockholder proposals and effectively chill individual
participation in corporate democracy in derogation of the intent of
the Act. Stockholders have apparently been relieved of the expense
and burden of pursuing their investor rights in private actions against
their corporation. Analysis of reviewability in terms of effect on the
agency, the courts, and the party seeking a remedy is to be
encouraged.8 s More liberal review under the general criteria employed
in Medical Committee could promote effectuation of the stockholder
proposal rules while conforming to section 25(a) review requirements
and should not evoke fear of unwarranted judicial intrusion from an
agency which objectively and fairly performs its statutory obligations.
But liberal interpretations must still meet statutory requirements. It is
imperative for future usage of the-Medical Committee test that the
relationship between finality, formality, and pragmatism and section
25(a)'s review requirements be clarified.
Reviewability of Emergency Suspension Orders Under the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and the Court of
86. See generally Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to
Agency Discretion," 82 HARV. L. REv. 367 (1968). In a case involving review under the
administrative procedure act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 (Supp. V, 1970), the District of Columbia
Circuit has likewise found the "practicalities of administrative involvement" sufficient to
warrant judicial review of otherwise informal SEC action. Independent Broker-Dealers Trade
Ass'n v. SEC, 39 U.S.L.W. 2506 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 4, 1971).
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